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Throughout American history, the problem of poverty has been a controversial
moral and political dilemma. Unfortunately, the majority of persons living in poverty are
children, who are unable to change their situation. According to the 1986 Current
Population Survey, 60.35% of the persons living in poverty were under the age of 18. 1
Social policies indicate that policy makers sense a moral obligation to provide some
sort of material assistance to the needy. However, with the exception of two states,
welfare benefits are not sufficient to raise a family above the poverty line2 . The public
consensus is that current welfare policies are in need of reform, but there is little
agreement about how it should be done.
Contemporary theories of distributive justice have also addressed the issue of
the distribution of basic goods and services to the least advantaged in society. These
theories range in scope from strict egalitarianism to desert-based principles. 3 In John
Rawls' A Theory of Justice, he proposes a theory of distributive justice which he calls
justice as fairness. 4 Rawls' theory concentrates upon the basic structure of society and
the way in which social institutions regulate basic rights and duties. Rawls maintains

I

Beyond Welfare' New Approaches to the problem of poverty in America. Ed. Harrell R.
Rodgers, Jr. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988. p. 7.

2Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Overview ofEntitlement
Programs: 1994 Green Book, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govermnent Printing
Office, 1994. P. 366.
3S t rict egalitarianism demands that each person should hold the same level of material
goods and services. In contrast, desert-based principles of distributive justice assert that people
deserve certain material goods and services in accordance with their contribution to society.
4Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory ofJustice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
I

that a distribution of primary social goods within a society must be done in order to
maximize the position of those who are the worst off in society. 5 Although Rawls' theory
of justice represents an abstract description of a just society, I maintain that this theory
provides an excellent theoretical framework with which to analyze the reformation of
the current American system of public assistance.
In my examination distributive justice and public assistance benefits, I will take

the following path. First, I will present an overview Rawls' theory of justice,
concentrating upon the distribution of primary social goods in accordance with the two
principles of justice established within the original position. In an examination of the
first principle of justice, I will also present Rawls' distinction between equal liberty and
the worth of liberty. This distinction is important as it relates to the inequality of the
worth of liberty to the least advantaged members of society. In understanding the
second principle of justice it is necessary to examine the definition of primary social
goods, as well as Rawls method of fairly distributing these goods. I will then contrast
Rawls' justice as fairness with the utilitarian description of a just society. I will also
present the egalitarian implications of Rawls' theory as they apply to current welfare
reform issues.

By placing my examination of the American welfare system within the

theoretical framework of justice as fairness, I will illustrate the benefit of this theory in
the analysis of the allocation of resources to alleviate poverty, homelessness, and
other afflictions of the poor.

SThis distribution must be done in accordance with a principle of equality. A discussion of
this principle can be found later in this paper.
II

In John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, he seeks to incorporate the concept of
equality with an extensive theory of justice. Rawls refers to his theory of justice as
"justice as fairness.'

6

By using this title, Rawls is not asserting that justice and fairness

are the same thing, but rather that the principles of justice are determined within an
original conceptual framework that is fair. This original framework is called the "original
position of equality," and is a hypothetical situation in which rational persons, acting as
agents on behalf of the concrete members of a society, choose the principles of justice
behind a "veil of ignorance."

7

Rawls maintains that decisions made in the original

position are fair because within the veil of ignorance, people are not aware of their
social status, natural abilities, intelligence, personal conception of the good, individual
psychological features, or their age. In addition, Rawls explains that behind the veil of
ignorance, people are also ignorant of the particular facets of their own society.
Rawls maintains that all members persons would be similarly situated within the
original position and the principles chosen would be those which are best for the entire
community; because no one would be aware of their particular situation, there would be
no way in which a person could decide upon a principle of justice in such a way that it
would be to her/his advantage. Fred D'Agostino explains the impartiality that Rawls'
theory aims to achieve with the following analogy:

My agent A cannot hold out for some social settlement that favors
people with those characteristics; s1he doesn't know what they are.
Slhe will therefore have to protect my interests, as s1he must as

6Ibid., p.12-13.
%id., p. 12.
III

their trustee, only by holding out for a social settlement in which no
one's interests are given short shrift. '

This does not mean, however, that people in the original position are completely
ignorant of any facts about society. On the contrary, Rawls contends that the people in
the original position are knowledgeable about the general aspects of human societies,
such as economics, political theory, psychology, sociology, etc. Without this general
knowledge, they would not be able to make informed decisions about any principles of
justice, nor would they be able to gauge the implications of their decisions. 9 ln addition,
the agents within the original position would not see themselves as individuals isolated
from society. Instead, they would view themselves as related to and responsible for the
subsequent generations of persons within that community.
Rawls contends that because the agents within the original position would be
similarly situated, there is no reason for an individual agent to expect more than an
equal share of social goods and liberties. 10 Therefore, Rawls asserts that agents within
the original position would first decide upon a principle of equality. This first principle
dictates that, "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty

'D' Agostino, Fred. 1996. "Original Position." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (23
Feb. 1996): 5 pp. Online. Internet. 18 Mar 1997.
"Rawls, p. 137-8.
l"Because the agent has no knowledge of herlhis social or economic status, agreeing to a
principle that would divide social goods un-equally would not be rational. Rawls contends that no
rational person would agree to anything less than an equal share of social goods and basic
liberties. (Rawls, p. 150)
IV

compatible with a similar liberty for others."

11

In addition, Rawls maintains that a

second principle would be adopted by agents within the original position. The second
principle states, "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to aiL"

12

Rawls defines the liberties guaranteed by the first principle as, "... roughly
speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together
with freedom of speech, assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought;
freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; freedom from
arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law."

13

The second

principle is primarily concerned with the distribution of wealth and income, and the
structure of social institutions. Rawls explains that the first principle always takes
priority over the second. These two principles of justice are specific points of a more
general theoretical framework which dictates that, "All social values...are to be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to
everyone's advantage."

14

Inequalities in basic liberties cannot be justified by any

greater economic advantages, whereas social and economic inequalities may be
justified by adherence to the first principle.

"Rawls, p. 60.
12Ibid., p. 60.
"Ibid., p. 61.
"Ibid.
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Because of his emphasis upon the basic structure of society and social
institutions, Rawls limits his discussion of liberty to the legal and constitutional
restrictions upon liberty. He explains that for the purposes of this examination, liberty
can be defined in regards to three areas: (1) the free agent, (2) the restrictions that the
agent is free from, and (3) what the agent is free to do or not to dO. 15 Consequently, a
person is at liberty to perform an action [Xl when that person is free from restrictions to
either perform X or not to perform X, and when this freedom is protected from the
interference of other individuals. In addition, Rawls contends that there must be a legal
duty, on the part of the government and other individuals, not to interfere with a
person's liberty to perform X. This legal duty of non-interference is not valid unless the
liberty in question falls within the boundaries of the first two principles of justice.
Therefore, because an action such as slavery would not be a liberty that satisfies the
principles of justice, there would be no legal duty of non-interference. 16
Rawls asserts that basic liberties must then be examined as a system, rather
than individually evaluating each one. This approach follows his structural concept of
justice and is necessary because liberties often conflict with each other. He notes that
the worth of a particular liberty is dependent upon the boundaries of other liberties. A
clear example of this can be found in the freedom of assemble. While Rawls lists this
as a basic liberty, he would distinguish this freedom from specific rules of conduct such

·'Ibid., p. 202.
16Ibid.
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as mob action, obstruction, or violent protest. 17 These specifications restrict the
freedom of assembled groups, but are necessary so that all individuals are able to
benefit from this freedom. 16
Although philosophical discussions on the subject of liberty often concentrate on
the definitive meaning of liberty, Rawls chooses instead to concentrate upon the value
or worth of liberty. He maintains that equal liberty and the worth of liberties are two
distinctly different concepts. Rawls views liberties as the complete system of equal
citizenship, whereas the worth of liberties are to be weighed in accordance to a groups
ability to advance within this complete system. Assume for example, that there is a
basic liberty to interstate travel; although everyone would be entitled to this liberty, only
those who possessed the means to travel would be able to exercise this liberty.
Consequently, the worth of this specific liberty would be greater for those who had the
means to enjoy it, in comparison to those who did not possess the same means to
interstate travel. Therefore, although the first principle of justice calls for an equal right
to basic liberties, it does not require that these liberties carry an equal worth among
individuals.
Rawls considers the first principle to be clearly stated and easily interpreted.
However, the ambiguity of the language in the second principle leads to interpretive
difficulty. Specifically, Rawls asserts that the phrase "everyone's advantage," contains

l7The freedom of assembly example is not to be confused with civil disobedience, which
Rawls defines as public non-violent political activity. Later in the text, Rawls develops a three
point justification for civil disobedience and the duty ofjustice. (Rawls, p. 371-377)
"Rawls, p. 203.
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two possible interpretations. The phrase, "everyone's advantage" can either be
interpreted as a principle of efficiency, or as a difference principle. The principle of
efficiency would dictate that social structures are designed in such a way that there is
no way to improve the socioeconomic situation of one group in society without
declining the socioeconomic condition of another group. This principle is problematic
when applied to situations in which there is an unequal distribution of primary goods
and liberties. For example, in holding with the principle of efficiency, the exploitation of
low wage labor for the profit of the employer would be deemed efficient; there would be
no way to reform such an institution without declining the socioeconomic condition of
the employer. 19 Therefore, Rawls finds that the principle of efficiency is defective in that
it would allow for situations that are efficient, rather than just.
Interpreting this point as a difference principle would mean that society is to be
structured so that the least advantaged in society can reasonably expect to benefit from
the inequalities resulting from the basic social structure. In order for the difference
principle to produce situations that are just, it is first necessary to ensure that society is
structured in such a way that there is a fair equality of opportunity. This equality of
opportunity would guarantee that persons with the same abilities and motivation have
an equal chance of holding institutional positions of power, regardless of the
socioeconomic position that they came from. 20 Rawls refers to this interpretation as the
democratic interpretation of equality, because it combines a fair equality of opportunity

'''Ibid., p. 71.
2°Ibid., p. 83.
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with the difference principle. Rawls explains that, "This principle removes the
indeterminateness of the principle of efficiency by singling out a particular position from
which the social and economic inequalities of the basic structure are to be judged."21
Once the interpretive boundaries of the second principle of justice are
established by use of the difference principle, Rawls then examines the manner in
which social goods should be distributed. He asserts that the distribution of social
goods and basic liberties is a purely procedural issue. He explains that perfect
procedural justice involves two essential properties.

First, there is an independent criterion for what is a fair division, a
criterion defined separately from and prior to the procedure which
is to be followed. And second, it is possible to devise a procedure
that is sure to give the desired outcome.
The main assumption is that within the system of procedural justice, there is a method
with which to determine what is just, and a set procedure to use to achieve it. 22 Rawls
maintains that if a society begins with an underlying fair equality of opportunity and
designs social institutions that support this equality, then the resulting pattern of
distribution satisfies the difference principle. He states, "The intuitive idea is to design
the social system so that the outcome is just, whatever it happens to be, at least so
long as it is within a certain range."23 Therefore, as long as social institutions are

2%id., p. 75.
22To contrast this point, Rawls uses the comparison of a perfect system of procedural
justice, to an imperfect system of procedural justice. An imperfect procedural justice is one in
which there is no established procedure that is guaranteed to produce a just outcome.
23Rawls, p. 85.
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structured correctly, the distribution procedures that follow from these institutions are
most likely just. However, Rawls notes that it is the principle of fair opportunity that
provides stability to this system of distributive justice; without this principle there is no
way to guarantee that the distribution of primary social goods follows pure procedural
justice. 24
Rawls defines primary goods as things which are necessary means to a rational
man's desired end. In spite of individual differences in 'life plans', Rawls maintains that
there are certain primary goods that are commonly desired by rational individuals. He
states, "Greater intelligence, wealth and opportunity for example, allow a person to
achieve ends he could not rationally contemplate otherwise. ,,25 The more of these
goods that a person has, the greater chance that person has of achieving her/his ends.
In the discussion of distributive justice, Rawls focuses upon those primary goods which
are regulated by the structure and laws of the institutions of society. He refers to these
regulated primary goods as primary social goods because of this connection to social
institutions.
A fundamental difficulty with the distribution of primary social goods is
establishing a method with which to determine what a fair distribution would be.
According to the serial order of the two principles of justice, basic liberties and
opportunities are both consistently equal. The only primary social goods that would
vary in their distribution are authoritative powers, income, and wealth. Therefore,

24Ibid., p. 87.
"Ibid., p. 93.
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Rawls contends that it is necessary to institute an index by which to measure the value
of different primary social goods. He states that because of the difference principle,
''The only index problem that concerns us is that for the least advantaged group. The
primary goods enjoyed by other representative individuals are adjusted to raise this
index, subject of course to the usual constraints."26 Therefore, he asserts that in order
to ensure a fair distribution of primary social goods, the agents in the original position
need only focus upon the ways in which the distribution of such goods affects the least
advantaged.
Rawls' justice as fairness implies that on a basic level there should be some
areas of equality among persons. There are many moral theories which propose that a
just society is dependent upon a certain amount of equality among individuals. Within
this group of theories of justice, utilitarianism has remained the subject of contemporary
philosophical discussion. Rawls seeks to present an alternative to the utilitarian
doctrines that have evolved in the field of social ethical theory. He spends a
considerable amount of time contrasting justice as fairness to the classic utilitarian
tradition. 27 The most obvious distinction is the theoretical difference between the
teleological and the deontological approaches to moral theory.
Although there are many different utilitarian theories, one common assertion in

2·Ibid., p. 93-94.
27 Although

Rawls goes into considerable detail in contrasting these two theories, for the
purposes ofthis paper, I have chosen to limit the comparison to two main theoretical differences;
(1) the teleological vs. deontological approach, and (2) the use of principles appropriate on an
individual basis for the evaluation of a whole society, rather than applying social principles to the
individual.
XI

these theories is that an action is right if it maximizes the good. In this assertion, the
"good" is defined independently from and prior to what is right. In John Stuart Mill's
utilitarian philosophy, he exemplified this doctrine through what he referred to as the

greatest happiness principle (GHP). This principle dictates that an action is right in so
far as it tends to produce the greatest happiness and is wrong as it produces the
opposite of happiness. 28 Therefore, utilitarianism can be defined as a teleological ethic
which relies upon the consequence of an action to determine whether or not the action
is right. Mill contends that the greatest sum of happiness or pleasure is the measure
upon which to judge your action. If happiness is to be measured in the context of a
community, then individual actions that cause an individual harm, while at the same
time producing a greater happiness for the community, would be determined to be
"right".
Justice as fairness is a deontological approach in that it does not determine an
action to be right if it maximizes a previously and independently defined good. In other
words, it does not rely upon the consequences of an action as a basis for determining
what is good. Instead, a principle of equal liberty is agreed to be right prior to any
knowledge of what the particular consequences of adhering to this principle would be.
Rawls states,

Hence in justice as fairness one does not take men's propensities
and inclinations as given, whatever they are, and then seek the best
way to fulfill them. Rather, their desires and aspirations are

2'MiIl, John Stuart. 1861. "Utilitarianism." Classics of Western Philosophy, Third Edition.
Ed. Steven M. Cabn. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977. 1063
1104.

XII

restricted from the outset by the principles ofjustice which specifY
the boundaries that men's systems of ends must respect.. .injustice
as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good. 29

To further contrast this theoretical difference between classic utilitarianism and
justice as fairness, it is useful to examine the example of slavery. This example
provides an illustration of one of the difficulties Rawls finds with utilitarianism and
individual liberties. If a vast majority of individuals derived great happiness from the
enslavement of a minority of individuals, Mill's greatest happiness principle would
determine that slavery was right. However, Rawls finds that such a situation would be
incompatible with justice as fairness as it would clearly violate the first principle of
equal liberty. Therefore, Rawls maintains that, "...the interests requiring the violation of
justice have no value. Having no merit in the first place, they cannot override its
claims."

30

More specifically, Rawls contends that classic utilitarianism denies any

inviolable individual rights. On the contrary, classic utilitarianism allows for an
individuals' happiness to interfere with the liberties of others. He contrasts this aspect
of classic utilitarianism to justice as fairness by stating, "Each person possesses an
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot
override."

31

Another theoretical difference between classic utilitarianism and justice as
fairness is the way in which the principles of a society are evaluated. Rawls contends

~wls, p. 31.

"'Ibid., p. 31.
3%id., p. 3.
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that on a basic level it is easy to assume that the most reasonable concept of justice is
utilitarian. Following the utilitarian doctrine, it is right for a person to advance her/his
own ends, in so far as it doesn't affect others. Taking this doctrine further, to the
societal level, it would be reasonable to assume that what works for one person could
work for an aggregate of individuals. In this situation, the actions of a law maker and an
ordinary citizen would be weighted equally; in each situation the actions of the
individual determines the allocation of basic liberties and social goods for the whole.
Rawls finds difficulty with this point stating, "Utilitarianism does not take seriously the
distinction between persons."

32

In Ubera/ Equality, Amy Gutmann examines the egalitarian implications of Rawls'
justice as faimess. 33 She explains that a moral theory is considered to be egalitarian if
it, "...on the whole recommends a more equal distribution of goods (broadly defined)
and opportunities than exists within the society to which it is addressed by the theorist
or by the student applying it at a different time. "34 Therefore, Gutmann maintains that
when applied to current Anglo-American societies, Rawls' theory has egalitarian
implications in both its substance and scope. Gutmann explains that Rawls
incorporates a classical liberal position on the equalization of liberties with, "... a
potentially radically egalitarian stance on maximizing the worth (or positive side) of

32Ibid., p. 27.
"Gutmann, Amy. 1980. Liberal Equality. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
"Ibid., p. 2.
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liberty to the worst off within any given society...35 In addition, Gutmann contends that
once Rawls establishes the first principle of equal liberties, the difference principle
implies that absolute equality in the distribution of primary social goods would be an
equitable policy. Gutmann proposes that there should be an egalitarian addition to
Rawls' first principle of justice. She asserts that in addition to basic liberties there are
certain basic goods and services that are also necessary in order for an individual to
advance her/his ends. These goods and services would include education and job
training, housing and employment, medical care and legal services.

By their nature, both legal and medical care rather frequently
require large amounts of money at unpredictable times during most
people's lifetimes...Therefore, granting that people within the
original position are for good reason risk-averse agents, a strong
case can be made either for distributing services in kind or for
providing payments tied to the satisfaction of medical and legal
needs. 36
Gutmann contends that the distribution of legal and medical services would be a
rational decision within the original position. This egalitarian addition to the first
principle of justice would give welfare rights a higher priority and would provide the
means to obtain what she calls a basic effective liberty. This basic effective liberty is
defined as the combination of formal liberties with basic welfare rights.
Rawls' theory of justice presents a more holistic approach to social policy
making than the current system seems to provide. Rather than focusing upon the
reciprocal interest in providing for and uplifting the status of the poor, policy makers

"Ibid., p. 124.
36Ibid., p. 126.
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have instead focused upon the cost-ineffectiveness of current welfare programs. Since
individuals are naturally unequal in different areas, Rawls asserts that the members of
society who hold a higher economic status must make periodic compensation to those
who are in a lesser position. In doing this, those who hold lower positions in society will
find their position enhanced. Rawls explains that there is a reciprocal interest in
uplifting the status of the lower economic class:

...a society should try to avoid the region where the marginal contributions of
those better off to the well being of the less favored are negative. It should operate
on the upward rising part of the contribution curve...there is a natural sense in
which the harmony of social interests is achieved...Once a society goes beyond the
maximum it operates along the downward loping part of the curve and a harmony
of interests no longer exists. As the more favored gain the less advantaged lose,
and vice versa37 .

However, in keeping with the United States Constitution, the right of the individual
liberty interferes with Rawls' notion of a fundamental right to the minimum social
goods38 .
In recent welfare reform proposals, there has been a trend towards restructuring
the welfare system by limiting government commitments to the poor while maintaining
assistance to the truly needy. This trend reflects a return to the ideas about the worthy
and the unworthy poor present during the time of the Elizabethan Poor Laws. The
Elizabethan Poor Laws were adopted in the early 1600's in England and traveled to

37

Ibid., p. 104-105.

38 According to Rawls' opportunity principle, individual members of society must
contribute to the welfare ofthe less advantaged. The constitution does not prescribe this
contribution as a duty of the individual. Contributing to the well being ofothers may be viewed as
interfering with an individual's right to liberty.
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America with the colonists. Under these laws, the unemployed were required to return
to their place of origin if they were unable to secure employment elsewhere. There
were facilities for the "worthy poor" who were either incompetent or physically unable to
work, and work programs for persons who were able to work. Criminal penalties were
imposed upon unemployed persons who refused to take part in work programs. In
addition, the children of the poor could be taken away from their families and made to
work as reimbursement for the cost of their parents' idleness. 39
There has however, been a change in the public's definition of the unworthy
poor. Social insurance programs, which were originally perceived as programs that had
been earned through contribution through taxes, have recently become the target of
budget cutting reforms. Traditionally, social insurance programs were designed for the
worthy poor. However, because of the increase in disability claims, many persons
receiving this social insurance are considered to be members of the unworthy poor.
Women have also become the new class of the unworthy poor. Because of the
nature and scope of persons receiving AFDC benefits, this public assistance program
is often said to encourage the "welfare" lifestyle. AFDC provides cash benefits for
parents in low income households, and increases according to the number of children
living in the household. Because the majority of children receiving AFDC benefits live in
female-headed, single-parent households, many critics of the current welfare system
maintain that AFDC benefits are rewarding women for having additional children.

39

Lafrance, A.B. Welfare Law' Structure and Entitlement in a Nut Shell. St. Paul, MN:
West Publishing Company. (1979) p. 1-3.
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The Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 199640 contains
multiple reductions aimed towards reducing the number un-wed and teenaged mothers,
as well as discouraging women currently on welfare from having more children. In
addition, there has been a resurgence in work incentive programs that aim to enable
these women to earn an income and eventually leave the welfare system. The State of
Wisconsin recently implemented changes to its state welfare policy and has become a
model for national welfare reform. These changes include time limits for individuals
receiving welfare benefits, mandatory participation in workfare programs, and a
reduction in additional benefits for women currently receiving welfare who become
pregnant and have more children. The Wisconsin example has been hailed as a
solution to the problem of the increasing number of individuals receiving welfare
benefits. However, what the Wisconsin example lacks is a Rawlsian examination of the
structural forces influencing unemployment, unaffordable child care, teenaged
pregnancy, un-wed motherhood, and the fatherhood-and-f1ight syndrome
Examining current American welfare reform issues within the theoretical
framework of Rawls' justice as fairness, policy makers must first concentrate upon the
underlying structure of social institutions. An agent situated within the original position
would first ensure that each individual holds an equal right to the most far-reaching
basic liberties possible, in as much as can be compatible with a similar liberty for other
individuals. Because the United States constitution dictates a principle of equality
similar to Rawls' first principle of justice, I maintain that for practical purposes we can

40

Public Law 104-193, HR 3734, 42 U.S. 1305.
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assume that this principle has been satisfied, at least in theory. When this principle of
equality is satisfied, the agent would then examine the social and economic inequalities
existing in American society. In an attempt to satisfy the difference principle,
recommendations for welfare reform would concentrate upon the measure of
inequalities produced by existing social institutions. The current American welfare
system would fail miserably because the inequalities are not arranged so that the least
advantaged in society can reasonably expect to benefit from them. Instead, the
American welfare system has been designed in such a way that the most advantaged
in society will suffer the least from existing inequalities.
Until the focus shifts from maintaining the status of the rich, to improving the
status of the poor, a Rawlsian distributive justice as fairness will never be realized. The
current welfare reform debate has primarily focused upon the unworthy poor, their
inability to support themselves, and the burden that the least advantaged place upon
the most advantaged in society. Therefore, the implications of examining welfare
reform within the justice as fairness paradigm would force the American public to view
the systematic institutional failures of public assistance, rather than the failure of
individuals to overcome the obstacles that this failed system has put before them.
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